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Abstract
Shipbuilding has changed from a “heavy industry“ to become a capital- and technology-
intensive activity over the last decades. While Japanese, South Korean and Western European
yards dominate the merchant shipbuilding market so far, Eastern European yards are
increasingly active, in particular in low and medium complex ships. We develop a market
analysis and identify the axes of competition in international civil shipbuilding. From there, we
analyze the restructuring process of Eastern European yards. Polish yards have proceeded with
relatively quick enterprisation, establishing strong links to domestic and international suppliers.
Restructuring in Russian and Ukrainian yards is blocked by local obstacles to enterprization,
leading to increasing competitiveness gaps with CEE-yards. We conclude that a
science&technology policy should be demand-oriented and target only the clearly identified
obstacles to enterprization.
JEL-classifications: L62, P51, O38
Zusammenfassung
Die Schiffbauindustrie hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehnten von einer Schwerindustrie zu einer
kapital- und hochtechnologieintensiven Branche entwickelt. Neben den marktführenden
Werften Japans, Südkoreas und Westeuropas drängen nun auch verstärkt mittel- und
osteuropäische Werften auf die internationalen Schiffbaumärkte. Wir identifizieren
Marktsegmente und Wettbewerbsachsen und leiten hieraus die aktuelle Situation der
osteuropäischen Werften ab, die recht unterschiedlich sind. Polen schaffte es durch eine rasche
Unternehmisierung seiner Werften und die Umstrukturierung der Produktionsprozesse, der mit
dem Aufbau eines internationalen leistungsstarken Zuliefernetzwerkes einher ging,
wettbewerbsfähige Schiffe internationale anbieten zu können. Der Umstrukturierungsprozeß
der Werften in Rußland und der Ukraine ist dagegen wegen verzögerter Unternehmisierung
und Privatisierung blockiert und führt zu einem zunehmenden Rückstand gegenüber ihren
Konkurrenten. Eine Wissenschafts- und Technologiepolitik sollte nachfrageorientiert sein und
sich auf die Beseitigung eindeutig identifizierter Hindernisse der Umstrukturierung
beschränken.
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1. Introduction
The shipbuilding industry has undergone a drastic change over recent decades; from being a
„heavy industry“ it has turned into a high-tech, information-dominated industry, with over 70%
of value-added outsourced in hierarchised supplier networks. In the Western world, Asian
shipyards seem to have definitely taken the lead, with European yards keeping some market
niches in the high-end segments. Yet, there is no country that does not subsidise its
shipbuilding industry, leading to severely distorted markets. In Eastern Europe, a new divide is
emerging after the collapse of socialist shipbuilding: while Central and Eastern European
countries, in particular Poland, are gaining international competitiveness, post-Soviet, i.e.
Russian and Ukrainian yards, have not yet succeeded in the process of enterprisation.
Nonetheless, the arrival of Eastern European yards has a major impact on the world-wide
restructuring of industry, both as regards competition and patterns of co-operation.
In this paper, we carry out an industrial economic analysis of the international shipbuilding
industry in the East and West, identify links to the science and technology (S&T) system, and
provide an evaluation of the restructuring process of Eastern European shipyards. Our
question is: what patterns of co-operation and competition are Eastern European yards
engaging in after successful enterprisation, and is there still a rationale in pursuing national
S&T policies for shipbuilding?
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2, we describe the changing shipbuilding industry
in the „West“ as observed over the last 20 years or so. Segmentation of the market has
increased (in favour of cargo ships), and so has regional specialisation. Yet, after years of
„crises“ and restructuring, overcapacities still abound and productivity gains are crucial for
yard survival. The links between shipyards and the S&T system are multiple. In section 3, we
carry out a similar analysis for Eastern European countries. Once highly integrated and
supplying mainly socialist countries, these yards have all engaged in a radical enterprisation
process, more or less watched over and supported by their respective governments. In 1997,
the trough is definitely over for the advanced yards in Eastern Europe, that occupy increasing
market shares. The question as to whether direct S&T support is necessary is open: at least for
the advanced countries, the close co-operation with Western suppliers, yards, and shipping
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companies indicates that the integration into the international S&T system is far more
important. In section 4, we sketch out policy conclusions.2
2. The shipbuilding industry
2.1. Structure of production and links to the S&T system in the shipbuilding
industry
2.1.1. Production of a ship
Contrary to popular belief, shipbuilding is no longer a labour-intensive, mainly blue-collar
„heavy“ industry. Once classified as „engineering-based“, shipbuilding has developed to
become a capital-intensive, high-technology industry, with a high dependency upon upstream
R&D and innovation activities. Its high technology content, rapid pace of product and process
innovation, and deep linkages upstream and downstream make it a key industry for many
coastal industrialised countries. In this section we show that today, shipbuilding has become an
information-dominated, capital-intensive activity, where productivity gains stem mainly from
sources of innovation outside the yard.
A ship is more than welded steel, it consists of several sub-systems which must work smoothly
together to guarantee a faultless functioning of the complete ship: a ship is a combination of
electronics, information technology and several materials, pieced together in a yard in order to
fulfil certain functions at sea. There is no such thing as „best practice“ in the sense of an
optimal mode of production because ships are mostly produced as single unit production or
only in small numbers.
The production process can be divided into three steps:3
1. Planning phase: project planning, design and construction.
2. Production phase: project co-ordination and production.
3. Finishing phase: finishing, testing and inspection.
                                               
2
 As is usual practice, we do not cover the naval, military shipbuilding, for reasons of absence of information.
As concerns ship repair, we consider it to be a niche activity within the sector, but which we do not cover
separately.
3
 Fritsch (1992), p. 84.
The Shipbuilding Industry8
In the planning phase the shipyard has to plan the complete shipbuilding project. This includes
outlining the financing of the project, the design and construction of the ordered ship, ordering
the required components and material. The second stage, the production phase, can be
summarised as follows:
- receipt of materials, storage
- plate cutting
- panelling (welding plates to panels)
- hull construction
- conservation of hulls and sections
- outfitting (electronics, equipment, motors, etc.)
In the finishing phase the final work is done before the ship is delivered to the customer. This
phase includes final finishing work, testing and the instruction of the customer.4
The description shows that the production process requires the co-ordination of several
activities where each of them can become a bottleneck if co-ordination fails. The co-ordination
becomes more complex, the more components are delivered by suppliers. With a rising
outsourcing level, the co-ordination costs also rise. The use of modern information technology
in the planning and production phase enables the shipyards to outsource more and more
activities. A result of this is the decreasing level of value added within each yard and a rising
share of material costs.
2.1.2. Cost structure in shipbuilding
Production costs in shipbuilding depend upon scale and scope economies, the quality of a ship,
and the degree of outsourcing. Roughly, the following cost structure can be identified:5
- materials (machinery, equipment, steel),
- labour cost
                                               
4
 Fritsch (1992), p. 84.
5
 Cf. „The European Shipbuilding Industry“ (1995); unpublished consultant report; and Borla (1995).
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- overheads.
While steel is the most important individual cost element, machinery and equipment offer more
flexibility in terms of supply strategy. Labour costs are composed of design work, metal
treatment and transport, logistics, fitting-out, and other services. Design is the most expensive
activity, in part carried out by the yard itself; an average 100,000-120,000 man hours are
required for a series of three ships.6 Overheads account for 80-130% of total labour costs; they
include commercial costs (prospecting, negotiation, sales), financial costs, and basic expenses
for internal R&D, computer-equipment (CAD/CAM), and the like. Table 1 provides an
estimation of the cost structure for different ships.
Table 1: Distribution of cost elements for different types of ships7
Type of Ship Steel other Material Labour and
overheads
other
VLCC (180,000 t) 20% 37% 39% 4%
LPG-tanker (4,000 t) 5% 60% 29% 6%
Container (3,500 TEU) 11% 44% 40% 5%
Tug 4% 59% 33% 4%
The increase in capital intensity in recent years has also brought about an increase in the use of
information technology on ships. This is not only caused by the attempt to reduce the number
of crew-members (e.g. through integrated ship control, crew-free engine rooms, computerised
cargo surveillance), but also to cope with increasing safety requirements. Thus, not only the
production and repair of a ship, but also the running of a ship have become an information
technology-intensive activity, where innovation comes as much from the software supplier as
from the user.8
                                               
6
 ibid.
7
 Source: Committee of EEC Shipbuilder’s Association.
8
 Typical fields of informatisation on a ship on the way to integrated ship control are the following („The
European Shipbuilding Industry“, op cit, Exhibit 10):
- high manoeuvrability in port through the integration of control of the main propellor, the rudder and the two
sidethrusters into a single joystick rendering tug assistance superfluous;
- programmed sequences facilitating single push-button activation of complete engine room systems;
- voyage management with route planning and automatic course and speed setting to comply with the route
plan (for safety reasons, each automatic setting requires acknowledgement by the watch-keeper);
- monitoring from the bridge of systems, machinery, and cargo spaces;
- power management providing automatic operation of electric generators;
The Shipbuilding Industry10
                                                                                                                                                  
- diagnosis system offering assistance in fault-finding and remedy of faults.
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2.1.3. Four cost reduction strategies
Given the intensification of competition on the European and international markets, different
strategies of diversification and cost reduction can be observed in the yards. Depending upon
which strategy (-ies) are chosen by the respective yard, the sources and loci of innovation will
vary. One can distinguish at least four different strategies:
i) Outsourcing and reduction of „core activities“ (so-called „shipbuilding only“-strategy). Just
like in automobile or machine production, Western capitalist shipbuilding has adopted the
concept of „lean production“ over the last decade.9 Today, over 70% of the value-added of a
ship comes from suppliers outside the yard; this tendency is increasing. The shipyard is reduced
to purchasing and assembling (so-called „System leader“). Its productivity gain no longer
comes from own R&D, but mainly from optimising the assembly procedure through
„Simultaneous Engineering“.10 The suppliers organise themselves in hierarchical order, so that
the largest suppliers themselves become „system suppliers“, including R&D and services. This
also implies close information integration between shipyard and system suppliers, and system
suppliers and simple suppliers.11
ii) From individual production to „compact shipyards“. The issue of outsourcing is also
directly related to the changing paradigm in shipbuilding: away from individual production
towards automated assembly production in so-called „compact yards“. The idea is to
standardise the production process as much as possible, and to establish half-automated
assembly lines. The three most modern shipyards under construction in Europe were conceived
as compact yards (Kvaerner Warnemünde, MTW Wismar, Peene Werft Wolgast).
iii) Specialisation, in particular between shipbuilders within a larger industrial group. A
tendency that is gaining momentum in Europe is the concentration of shipbuilding and the
increasing specialisation of production in individual yards.12 Yard specialisation can improve
                                               
9
 VSM (1994), p. 20.
10
 VSM (1994), p. 21.
11
 The 400 German supply enterprises, for example, employ about 70,000 people, and have a turnover of 13 bn.
DM (7 bn. Ecu), 60% of which is exported. At the same time, the German shipbuilding industry employs
„only“ 22,000 people and has a turnover of 5 bn. DM (2.8 bn. Ecu).
12
 Röller; Hirschhausen (1996), p. 19.
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productivity and yield economies of scale, both in design and assembly. Also, the take-over of
yards may facilitate the gradual reduction of capacity, as the closure of any one yard can be
gradually prepared for within a group (it is not an „all-or-nothing“ decision, as in the case of
single-yard firms).13
iv) Downstream integration to assure captive markets. Capital participation in shipping
companies may be a means for a shipbuilder to assure captive markets, but also to approach
the client’s potential demand and technology changes. Capital ownership may be in both
directions (i.e. shipyards owning shipping companies, e.g. the 50% stake that Bremer Vulkan
held in the shipper Senator/DSR Reederei), or shipping companies owning shipyards (as in the
Danish case, A.P. Moeller owning Odense shipyard and J. Lauritzen owning Danyard). Table 2
shows that 11 of the world’s largest shipbuilders have a capital forward integration with
shipping companies.
                                               
13
 The best example for scope economies from concentration is the Norwegian Kvaerner group; others are the
concentration process under way in Northern Germany (Thyssen Industrie, combining Blohm+Voss and the
Thyssen Nordseewerke, which Preussag’s Howaldtswerk Deutsche Werft AG may join) and - until recently -
the Bremer Vulkan concentration strategy.
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Table 2: Downstream integration of the world’s 20 largest shipbuilding groups14
Country Shipbuilding group Rank in
world
shipbuil
ding
capacity
(‘000
CGT)
respective shipping
company
number
of ships
‘000 GT Rank in
world
shipping
Japan MHI Mitsubishi Heavy
Industry
1 970 NYK, Nippon Yusen
Kaisha
274 11,400 1
Korea Hyundai Heavy
Industry
2 797 Hyundai Corporation 111 3,000 20
Japan Kawasaki Heavy
Industry
3 606 Kawasaki Kisen 157 6,000 7
Japan Tsuneishi Onomichi 4 558
Japan IHI 5 539
Japan Kurushima Hitachi 6 523
Japan Hitachi 7 522
Japan Simitomo 8 486
Korea Daewoo (incl. Shin-Ah) 9 424
Norway Kvaerner 10 420 Bergesen 46 4,400 10
Japan Mitsui Eng.&Shipb. 11 400 Mitsui OSK 259 9,400 2
Germany Bremer Vulkan15 12 340 Senator 30 919
Italy Fin Cantieri 13 327 Finmare Group 106 2,000
China CSSC 4 270 China Ocean Shipping 588 7,400 3
Korea Samsung HI 15 189
Spain AESA 16 159 Comp. Transatl. Esp.
SA
8 100
Korea Corea Shipbuilding &
Engineering
17 150 Hanjin 80 2,140
France Chantiers de
l’Atlantique
18 117
Germany HDW Group Kiel 19 114
Denmark Odense Skpis 20 102 Maersk, Möller AP 179 6,000 6
                                               
14
 As of 1993; source: Timmermann, Manfred (1993), p. 23.
15
 Liquidated in 1996.
The Shipbuilding Industry14
2.1.4. Different institutional settings of production
Beyond the general tendencies described above, different institutional settings of production
exist, which may also imply different links with the S&T system. We distinguish three „ideal
types“ of linking the process of shipbuilding to the upstream suppliers and downstream clients:
i) the individual, non-integrated shipyard; ii) the Danish Maritime cluster; iii) the Japanese
model of „co-competition“.
i) The individual, non-integrated shipyard in Europe has no stable capital or other relations,
neither with suppliers nor with clients. Its strategy is mainly cost reduction, production
differentiation and specialisation towards the high-end of ships (e.g. gas and chemical tankers,
passenger ships). It obtains productivity gains internally through automation of production,
externally by integrating its suppliers’ innovations. Being a non-integrated shipyard does not
imply the total absence of co-operation: the relations between almost all individual shipyards
are characterised by some form of „co-competition“: while they compete for smaller, individual
contracts, they co-operate in larger contracts, for which a single yard is to small. Many
Western European shipyards can be characterised as individual, non-integrated.
ii) The Danish Maritime cluster is an attempt to institutionalise innovation in a competition-
oriented environment.16 The peculiarity of the cluster is that it is downstream oriented: the
driving forces are the shipping companies that have accumulated capital participation of
particular shipyards.17 This does not impede competition between Danish and foreign yards; it
does imply, though, that shipper and shipyards co-operate closely in the development of new
technologies and new types of ships. If an innovative order is at stake, a shipper will place the
order with „his“ shipyards.18 The Danish maritime cluster furthermore stretches to system
suppliers, financial institutions, and the state. The latter subsidises shipping companies with
cheap and secured loans; the shippers can then pass on a part of the subsidy to their ship
producers (be they Danish or foreign). Further instruments of „clustering“ are research
                                               
16
 This section is based upon „The European Shipbuilding Industry“, op. cit, pp. 11-17.
17
 All but one shipyard in Denmark are owned by a shipping company: Odense Shipyard is owned by the
biggest Danish shipping company A.P. Moeller (Maersk Line), while the shipping company Lauritzen owns
Danyard, which was formed by a merger of Aalborg, Frederikshaven and Helsingoers shipyards. The only non-
integrated shipyard, Burmeister&Wain, went bankrupt in 1996...
18
 An example of such strategic behaviour is the development of very large container ships (Panamax-type),
which A.P. Moeller required, and the development of which it gave to its Odense shipyard.
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programs, partially financed by the Danish Ministry of Industry, in which shippers, shipyards,
suppliers, and other firms participate.19
iii) The Japanese model of state/industry „co-competition“ is based on an important role of
pre-competitive research (state-financed, carried out in a „National Institute for Shipbuilding")
and a long-term, unwritten co-operation understanding between the state, the yards, and the
shipping companies. In times of crises (e.g. the 1976-91 crisis), the state watches over the
restructuring of the shipbuilding industry and assures its survival; in expansionary times, the
shipyards actually compete with each other. Shipyards usually belong to a larger industrial
group („Keiretsu“). In 1993, eight of the world’s 11 largest shipyards were Japanese (see
above table 2). It seems that the South Korean institutional setting largely resembles the
Japanese one.
2.1.5. Links to the S&T system
2.1.5.1. Sources of innovations in the shipbuilding industry
The links to the S&T system are widely spread in the shipbuilding business because large parts
of production are outsourced to external enterprises. The sources of innovation are on one
hand the internal R&D capacities in the shipyard, and on the other hand external research
institutes and the suppliers of the shipyard.
The internal R&D capacities mostly carry out the project and ship design and the construction
plans. But sometimes even these tasks are outsourced to external partners. In particular, in
Eastern Europe the ship design is often developed outside the shipyard. Other very important
sources of innovations are the external partners of a shipyard, which are on one hand, the
suppliers, and on the other hand, the external research institutes.
                                               
19
 E.g. the „project ship“-programme, initiated in 1986, which was a research programme to develop high-tech
ships with modern information technology. The Danish Ministry of Industry financed 20 mn. DKR (out of a
total volume supposed to be 45 mn. DKR). The results of the project were indeed significant: integrated ship
control (software, system engineering) resulted in the reduction of crew members required on certain ships
from 15-16 to 6-7, i.e. by 60% (ibid, p. 14; exhibit 10). This „success“ does not at all imply that this research
could not have been realized without state support; on the contrary, as the benefits can be easily internalized,
and non-participants can be excluded from using the technology, there seems to be no reason why state support
was necessary.
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The high level of outsourcing implies that the suppliers occupy an important role as sources of
innovation in the shipbuilding industry. So the R&D on several components is carried out by
the supplying enterprises. This is true for equipment which is built in the ships (e.g. motors
radar systems, computers, software etc.) as well as the equipment which is needed for
production (e.g. robots, docks, plasma cutting machinery, cranes, etc.).
A third source of innovation in the shipbuilding industry are the external R&D institutes. These
institutes are engaged in basic as well as applied research. Almost all basic research is carried
out by institutes which are often state financed.
Figure 1: Sources of innovation in the shipbuilding sector
The importance of internal and external sources of innovation shifts with the level of
outsourcing/integration. With a rising level of outsourcing (decreasing level of integration) the
share of external R&D increases in the shipbuilding industry. With the outsourcing of
production, R&D is outsourced as well.
Shipbuilding industry
External R&D
departments
Internal R&D
departments
Supplier Research
institutes
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2.1.5.2. The case of Germany
In Germany, shipbuilding has a long tradition and therefore the R&D structure of the
shipbuilding industry is well established.20 The R&D activities in the German shipbuilding
industry are mainly focused on six different research fields:21
1. Basic research
This research field contains propulsion and resistance, manoeuvre, caviatation, Computational
Fluid Dynamics (CFD), movements in swell, loading research, future dimensioning of ships,
etc..
2. Production technology
This research field contains shipbuilding design technologies, planning and steering systems
(PPS) in production, development of robots and steering of them for welding and bending,
conservation and derust technologies, etc..
3. Ice technologies
This research field contains ice mechanics, development of icebreakers, offshore structures for
and oil accident combat in ice covered stretches of water, harbour technologies, ice calculation
and field measurements, etc..
4. Ship operation technologies
This research field contains development of technologies to increase the reliability, security and
economics of ship operations.
5. Fast and unconventional ships
In this research field new vessels with unconventional superseding structures and buoyancy
forces are developed.
                                               
20
 Roland Berger & Partner GmbH (1993), p. 47.
21
 Fritsche (1992), p. 80-85.
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6. Information technology in shipbuilding (ITIS)
In this research field the use of modern information technology in shipbuilding and shipping is
developed. Examples are control functions, loading control, computer steered production steps
etc..
To fulfil these manifold research tasks a complex R&D structure exists in Germany. The
following list should only give an impression of the R&D structure in Germany and is therefore
not complete. The following institutes are engaged in basic as well as applied research:
1. Max-Plank-Gesellschaften (mainly basic research),
2. Universities (mainly basic research),
3. Institutes of Fraunhofer Gesellschaften (mainly research for the industry)
4. Arbeitsgemeinschaft industrieller Forschungsvereinigungen (AIF)
5. R&D departments of enterprises (incl. suppliers)
The so-called shipbuilding experimental institutes are specialised in shipbuilding and sea
technologies:
1. Hamburgische Shiffbau-Versuchsanstalt GmbH (HSVA),
2. Versuchsanstalt für Wasserbau und Schiffbau, Berlin (VWS),
3. Versuchsanstalt für Binnenschiffbau Duisburg (VBD).
Teaching and research on shipbuilding and ship machine building are carried out at several
universities:
1. University of Hamburg, Institute for shipbuilding
2. TU Hamburg-Harburg
3. TU Berlin (shipbuilding)
4. RWTH Aachen
5. TU Hannover
6. Institut für Schiffsbetriebstechnik Flensburg
7. University of Rostock
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Alongside these mainly state financed research institutes, the Bundesministerium für Bildung,
Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie (BMBF) funds research projects. The Germanische
Lloyd (GL) is entrusted with the co-ordination and evaluation of these projects.22 In 1996 the
BMBF spent 45 million DM on special research projects for shipbuilding and maritime
technology.23
One peculiar element of shipbuilding's S&T-system in Europe is the so-called „Maritime-
Forum“. It was institutionalised in Europe, as well as in larger individual countries. It is a „joint
discussion forum“ between all participants of the maritime industry, from suppliers, research
institutions, yards, outfitters, security experts, harbour authorities, and shippers. This
corresponds to what the EEC-Commission has called a „horizontal industrial policy“ to
strengthen the competitiveness of industry.24 This vertical co-operation is being justified with
the argument of economising on transaction costs and spreading technical knowledge between
the enterprises. Individual countries have also established national "Maritime Forums" (e.g.
Germany, Denmark). It is certainly not clear, however, whether „clustering“ under state
governance will mislead to a bargaining for more subsidies.
2.2. The shipbuilding markets
2.2.1. Different segments of the shipbuilding market
Contrary to popular belief, shipbuilding is not a homogeneous sector. At first, four main
segments of the shipbuilding market can be distinguished: the merchant shipbuilding market,
the naval shipbuilding market, the inland shipbuilding market and the ship repair market.
The merchant shipbuilding segment is the largest of the four. Most western coastal industrial
countries have a shipbuilding industry which is, in all cases, subsidised by the government. The
independence of foreign trade is the most stressed argument for the requirement of a national
shipbuilding industry in those countries.
                                               
22
 Germanischer Lloyd (1996), p. 69.
23
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The naval ship market is economically of lower importance but it must be mentioned that all
countries with shipbuilding capacities are able to produce naval ships. Only in countries where
the state demand for naval ships was so high that the full capacities of complete yards were
used, do specialised yards exist solely for naval shipbuilding. Countries with large capacities
for naval shipbuilding only are the USA, Russia and Ukraine. After the end of the Cold War,
all countries with large naval shipbuilding capacities tried to convert their naval shipyards into
civil ship yards. This influences the conditions and capacities of the merchant shipbuilding
market. The conversion of naval shipyards leads to an increase in the already existing
overcapacities. Furthermore conversion processes are mostly supported by the governments to
a large extent, which increases the subsidising problem in the shipbuilding sector.25 Figures on
the development of this market segment and the industry (employment, products etc.) are
secret and therefore not available. Because of this, the naval shipbuilding industry will not be
analysed in this paper.
Inland shipbuilding plays an important role in countries with large waterways. In particular in
Eastern European countries goods are often transported on inland waterways because of the
bad condition of the roads. In western countries the importance of the inland shipping
decreases because transport on roads is cheaper and quicker than on waterways. In any case ,
inland shipbuilding is marginal when compared with the maritime shipbuilding industry.
The ship repairing industry contains pure ship repairing enterprises as well as shipbuilding
enterprises that also carry out ship repairing to make full use of their yard capacities.
The main focus of the paper is the merchant shipbuilding industry because of its importance for
countries in terms of turnover, employment etc.. The S&T policy conclusions would be
identical for the other segments, too.
Merchant shipbuilding market segments
The merchant shipbuilding market must be further divided into several segments because these
segments differ in their basic conditions, such as complexity of products, production
requirements, competition axes etc.. Complex equipment, special material or manufacturing
methods, and individual design, for example, increase the technology requirements of a ship
                                               
25
 The latest example is the USA, which did not sign the OECD agreement on the reduction of subsidies in
shipbuilding, because it would not longer be able to support the conversion process of its naval shipbuilding
industry.
by J. Bitzer and C. von Hirschhausen 21
yard. Corresponding to the different level of complexity of the ship types, and measured in
compensation coefficients, three groups of ships can be distinguished:
1. The first group of low complex ships (LCS) includes the most simple vessels, corresponding
to a compensation coefficient of between 0.25 and 1.85. These are type 1 (crude oil tankers
(single hull)), 2 (crude oil tankers (double hull)), 4 (bulk carriers (excluding combined
carriers)) and 5 (combined carriers) in the OECD classification.26 This ship group counts for
37.2% of world ship production in terms of CGT.27
2. The second group of medium complex ships (MCS) corresponds to intermediate
compensation coefficients of between 0.45 and 2.05. This includes types 3 (product and
chemical), 6 (general cargo), 7 (reefers), 8 (full container ships), 9 (roros), 10 (car carriers),
11 (LPGC) and 12 (LNGC).28 This group unites 48.8% of the world ship production in
terms of CGT.29
3. The third and last group of high complex ships (HCS) contains the remaining ships,
including compensation coefficients of between 0.9 and 6.0. This group embodies the types
3 (ferries), 4 (passenger), 5 (fishing) and 16 (other non cargo).3014% of the produced CGT
in the world belongs to this group.31
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Figure 2: Segments of the shipbuilding market
Each of these segments requires different strategies for success which will be analysed in the
next chapter.
Shipbuilding markets
Inland ship market Naval ship marketMerchant ship
markets
Ship repair market
High complex ships
- ferries,
- passenger,
- fishing,
- other non cargo
Low complex ships
- crude oil tankers (single hull),
- crude oil tankers (double hull),
- bulk carriers (excluding combined
carriers),
- combined carriers
Medium complex ships
- product and chemical,
- general cargo,
- reefers,
- full containerships,
- roros,
- car carriers,
- LPGC,
- LNGC
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2.2.2. Competition on the shipbuilding market
Competition on the shipbuilding market is very strong, because the shipping companies can
purchase their ships all over the world in a large number of fairly similar yards. The
overcapacities in the world further intensify this situation. The following can be identified as
active competition axes:32
• price, • customer service,
• quality, • flexibility,
• product innovation, • reputation, and
• delivery period, • financing services.
• meeting of deadlines,
The striking competition factor in all market segments is the price. In particular, in the segment
for LCS, which are produced in greater numbers as standard products, the price is the most
important competition axis. With increasing complexity the importance of the price
decreases.33
In the case of quality the relation between complexity of the vessel and the importance of the
competition axis is reversed. With an increase in the complexity, the importance of quality also
increases. The complexity of a ship is characterised by the use of complex equipment, special
material or manufacturing methods, individual design etc., in the production and equipment of
the produced ship. With more complex production methods or required equipment in the ship,
the likelihood of errors rises. Therefore the quality is more important than in the case of a LCS.
Product innovations are a key factor in competition on the shipbuilding market. Product
innovations in shipbuilding, for example, could reduce the number of crew required, lower
maintenance costs, increase load capacities, reduce unloading times etc.. So product
innovations play an important role in competition on the shipbuilding market. But not all ship
types have the same innovation potential.34 This depends on the degree of maturity and on the
complexity of the ship type. If a ship type has reached a high level of maturity it becomes more
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and more difficult to improve, for example the ship’s loading technology. In the case of
container ships, the innovation potential is still high because this ship type only originates in the
1980s. On the other hand, oil tankers have existed for longer and therefore an improvement is
more difficult. Nevertheless, there is a lot of innovation potential which concerns all ship types,
such as like propulsion technology, ship form etc..
Another important competition axis is the delivery period. Shipping companies are interested in
reducing delivery periods, because they can then reduce their investment risk. If the ship is
delivered very quickly, the risk of changing interest rates and currency changes is reduced. The
same is true for the change in shipping demand. When the delivery of a ship takes too long, the
situation on the shipping market can have changed immensely so that the ship is not required at
the time it is delivered.
The delivery period leads us to the next competition axis mentioned, the meeting of deadlines.
For shipping companies it is also important that the supplier holds to the delivery date, because
they have planned the use of the ship. Furthermore, delayed delivery increases the interest,
currency exchange and shipping demand risk as described above.
The next competition axis is customer service, which includes looking after the customer, not
only in the guarantee time, but also beyond this time. This service includes support or offering
repairs, modernisation, extension etc..
The flexibility of shipbuilders is very important in the production of HCS. Because these ships
are mostly single units, the possibility of influencing the planning and production process of the
ship is very important for shipping companies. The flexibility to integrate the wishes of the
customer in the planning and even in the production process, is therefore a competition
advantage.35
As the description of the competition axes above has shown, planning, production and
financing of a new ship is a complex task. Therefore, the reputation of a shipyard becomes an
important competition axis. If shipping companies have positive experience with a shipyard in
terms of delivery period, meeting deadlines, quality etc. the shipyard gains a competition
advantage over its competitors.
The purchase of a new ship is a large investment. Therefore questions of financing play an
important role for the demanding shipping companies. The offer of assistance or special
conditions for the financing of the ship is an important competition axis. In particular, in
countries where ship prices are high, such services can constitute a competition disadvantage in
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prices because in the medium and long and long term it works like a price reduction. So it can
be seen that financial services play a more important role in the segments for HCS than in the
segments for LCS.
2.3. Development of the shipbuilding industry
2.3.1. Demand for new ships
The demand for new ships has to be divided into the replacement demand and the additional
demand.
The replacement demand for new ships is influenced by:36
• the age structure of the world fleet,
• the development of the returns of shipping,
• the prices for new ships,
• interest rates,
• product innovations,
• and international legislation.
In particular, the age structure of the world fleet is decisive for the replacement demand. To a
certain extent the lifespan of a ship can be extended, but repair costs and maintenance costs
then increase. The average lifespan for a ship is between 20 and 30 years. The average age of
the world fleet in 1996 was 19 years. Measured in GT, 28% of the world fleet was 20 years old
or more in 1996. The following figure shows the share of ships over 20 years of age by ship
type.37
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Figure 3: Shares of ships over 20 years old in 1996 by ship types38
Low returns of the shipping business are a hampering factor for the purchase of new ships.
Because the ship owners have to finance the new ship, which is a large investment, the financial
situation of the demanding shipping enterprises is important. Equally important for the decision
are the prices of the new ships. The prices differ with the use of shipbuilding capacities and
currency developments.
The price leads us to the conditions of financing. The interest rates for financing are of great
importance because the purchase of a ship is a large investment. So ship owners defer their
ship purchases if interest rates are high. All the above-mentioned influencing factors can lead to
the decision to extend the use of a ship instead of buying a new one.
On the other hand, product innovation and the international legislation (IMO) can lead to an
increase of the replacement demand. In particular, if the innovations lead to a lower crew
number and/or a decrease of maintenance costs, ship owners often choose to purchase new
ships instead of modernising old ones. International agreements which lay down the required
ship equipment have another positive influence on replacement demand. For example, the
tanker accidents of recent years, with their large pollution of the environment, led to an
increase in security requirements in shipping and the shipbuilding business. The new
regulations for shipping and shipbuilding are internationally laid down by the International
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Maritime Organisation (IMO). These regulations normally lead in the medium term to the
requirement of modernising the equipment of a ship or purchasing of a new one (e.g. double
hull tankers).
The additional demand is influenced through:
• the development of seaborne trade,
• product innovations,
• the development of transport efficiency,
• and the development of transport alternatives.
Additional demand is required to serve the steadily growing seaborne trade. So the
development of this demand is closely connected to the development of world trade activities
and with it the seaborne trade. It is by far the most important influence on the demand for new
ships. Sometimes product innovations lead to an increase in the demand for new ships. For
example, the introduction of container units leads to an increase in demand for such ships.
The additional demand is negatively influenced by the increase in transport efficiency and an
increase in alternative transport possibilities. Developments in logistic management as well as
in transportation technology lead to an increase in transport efficiency which lowers the growth
rates of additional demand. The increasing importance of alternative transportation forms
lowers the demand development of special ship types. Oil and gas tankers, for example, get
more and more competition from pipelines; in particular in the growing trade between Western
and Eastern Europe, pipelines play an important role as transport medium. Passenger ships are
another example: as a result of falling prices for air travel, the demand for passenger transport
by ships decreases. Therefore the demand for passenger ships is negatively influenced by this
development.
2.3.2. Development of shipbuilding
The development of seaborne trade has the most important influence on the demand for new
ships. With a rise in seaborne trade, the demand for transport capacities also rises, with a lag.
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World seaborne trade grew steadily by about 20% from 3,977 million tonnes in 1990 to 4,790
million tonnes in 1996.39 In the same period, world ship production grew by about 41%.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996*
Completions in 1,000 CGT 11,656 11,526 12,116 12,380 12,636 14,325 16,550
Changes in % -1% 5% 2% 2% 13% 16%
Seaborne trade in million T 3,977 4,110 4,221 4,339 4,506 4,678 4,790
Changes in % 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 2%
Source: AWES, Annual Report 1996-1997/ Annual Report 1995-1996/ Annual Report 1994-1995
* estimated
Table 3: World ship production and seaborne trade 1991-96 in 1,000 CGT
The largest single transported good is still crude oil, followed by coal, ion ore, oil products and
grain.40
Shares of seaborne traded products 1996 in terms of  
transported tonnes
Crude Oil
30%
Oil products
8%
Iron ore
8%Coal
9%
Grain
4%
Other cargo
41%
Source: AWES (1997), p. 106.
Figure 4: Share of seaborne trade by goods 1996.
The different regions of the world participated differently in this increase in production in
recent years. Because ship yards all over the world compete with each other, the situation on
the world markets has recently changed immensely. Strong shifts between the market shares of
different countries can be observed. The push of the post-socialist countries of Central and
Eastern Europe on the world shipbuilding markets increases this tendency. The share of the
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AWES countries41 dropped from 28% in 1990 to 23% in 1994.42 In contrast to this, the market
share of South Korea increased from 13.4% in 1990 to 21.4% in 1996. The market leader,
Japan, more or less held its market share, which is about 40%. The rest of the world ("others"
in the following table), including the USA and China, also almost held their market share. It
should be added that the market share of China has risen quickly in recent years.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
AWES* 3,285 3,158 3,396 3,010 2,902 3,705 4,304
Market share in %* 28.2 27.4 28.0 24.3 23.0 25.9 26.0
Japan 4,456 4,417 4,379 4,854 5,177 5,644 5,991
Market share in % 38.2 38.3 36.1 39.2 41.0 39.4 36.2
South Korea 1,564 1,729 1,995 1,835 2,104 2,887 3,549
Market share in % 13.4 15.0 16.5 14.8 16.7 20.2 21.4
Others 2,351 2,222 2,346 2,681 2,453 2,089 2,706
Market share in % 20.2 19.3 19.4 21.7 19.4 14.6 16.4
Total 11,656 11,526 12,116 12,380 12,636 14,325 16,551
* From 1995 including Poland
Source: AWES, Annual Report 1996-1997/ Annual Report 1995-1996/ Annual Report 1994-1995
Table 4: World ship production by countries 1990-1996
The top 5 shipbuilding countries in the world are Japan, South Korea, Germany, China and
Italy. Together they held a market share of 72.1% in terms of compensated gross tonnage
(CGT) in 1996.43
Top 5 shipbuilding countries 1996
Country 1,000 CGT %
1. Japan 6,099 35.9
2. South Korea 3,603 21.5
3. Germany 1,123 6.7
4. China 777 4.6
5. Italy 564 3.4
Total 12,166 72.1
Source: VSM (1996), p. 34.
Table 5: Top 5 shipbuilding countries
An analysis of the market segments for different ship types shows a specialisation in different
regions of the world and countries.
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2.3.3. Specialisation of different countries
As described above the complexity of ships differs greatly and with the complexity the
requirements from shipyards also rises. With a change in the level of complexity, the shares of
labour and material costs shift. The share of labour costs for LCS is higher than in the case of
HCS, where the equipment raises the share of material costs. It can be observed that countries
with low labour costs, and often also low productivity, are mostly located in the market
segment for LCS. Countries with high labour costs try to use their productivity advantages and
technological knowledge to compete with the low labour cost countries. Today the
productivity advantages are mostly not high enough to compensated the disadvantages in
labour costs. Therefore the high labour cost countries are mostly engaged in high complex ship
market segments, where the labour costs are of lower importance than in the segments for low
complex standard ships.
in % AWES Japan South Korea Others
Low complex ships 6.1 53.1 27.5 13.3
Medium complex ships 29.9 30.3 22.6 17.1
High complex ships 65.5 11.7 1.2 21.6
Source: AWES (1997), p. 95.
Table 6: Market shares in different market segments by regions44
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Low
complex
ships
Medium
complex
ships
High
complex
ships
AWES
Japan
South Korea
Others
Figure 5: Strategies of specialisation by different regions
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Table 6 and figure 5 above show that Japan (53.1%) and South Korea (27.5%) dominate the
market segment for LCS. AWES45 countries were only able to capture an insignificant market
share of 6.1% although this market segment counts for 37.2% of the produced CGT in the
world.46
In the market segment for MCS, Japan and the AWES countries have nearly the same market
share about 30%. They are closely followed by South Korea with a market share of 22.6%. In
1996 the market segment for MCS corresponded to 48.8% of world ship production in terms
of CGT.47
In the market segment for HCS, the AWES countries are market leaders with 65.5% market
share and a large margin to the second. Japan holds only 11.2% and South Korea 1.2% of the
market for HCS. The market segment for HCS is the smallest of the three segments of the
shipbuilding market with 14% of world ship production in terms of CGT.48
The result of the analysis is that the different regions/countries are engaged in different market
segments. Japan is mainly engaged in the market segments of LCS and MCS which count for
86% of ship production world wide. As the complexity of the ships increases the market shares
of Japan decrease. But in the case of Japan this seems to be a more strategic decision than low
competitiveness in the HCS market segment. The same strategy can be observed in South
Korea which holds an important market share in LCS and MCS but an insignificant market
share of 1.2% in the HCS market segment. The 13 AWES countries are mainly engaged in the
more profitable HCS market segment where they hold a market share of 65%. As the
complexity of the ships decreases they lose their competitiveness, and, as a result of this, their
market share drops to only 6.1% in the market segment for LCS.
2.4. Current public policies in the shipbuilding sector
The development and competition in the shipbuilding industry is greatly influenced by public
policies all over the world. As a result of the regional differences in terms of public subsidies
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granted, the shipbuilding industry is characterised by a high distortion of competition. The
efforts in the European Union to harmonise the conditions of public support resulted in the
Seventh Directive (90/684/EEC) of the EC, which regulates public support in the EC. In
contrast to this, the attempt to reach harmonisation in the frame of the OECD (including Japan,
South Korea and the United States) failed. The "OECD Agreement on Normal Competitive
Conditions in the Commercial Shipbuilding and Repair Industry"49, which should already have
been enforced at the end of 1995, has still not come into force in mid of 1997. Today only the
United States has not ratified the agreement and therefore prevents its enforcement.50
Public support of the shipbuilding industry in the EC
In order to "minimise" the distortion of competition in the European Union in 1990 the
Seventh Directive (90/684/EEC) was passed, which regulates national aid to the shipbuilding
industry.51 The Directive contains two instruments: operating aid and restructuring aid.
Operating aid is granted as a percentage of the contract value before aid. Each year the EC
determines a ceiling for public aid, which results from a comparison between the most
competitive Community shipyards and their main competitors (mostly from the Far East). In
recent years the ceiling was fixed at 9.9%.52
Restructuring aid includes investment aid, aid for closures and aid for research and
development. The aim for this aid is to narrow the gap between the least and most efficient
shipyards. Another aim is the reduction of overcapacities in the industry. Investment aid may
not be granted for the creation of new shipyards or the creation of further overcapacities. The
implementation of the Seventh Directive is controlled by the European Commission. All aid
paid to shipyards must be authorised by the European Commission.
Furthermore, the EC funds research and development programs for maritime technology.53 In
addition to this, every national government in the EC has the possibility of funding further
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research and development projects in its own country. In 1996 Western Germany spent about
DM 45 million on R&D projects in maritime technology.54
Public support of the shipbuilding industry in Japan and South Korea
Information about the financial support granted to the shipbuilding industry is handled very
restrictively by the institutions in the Asian countries. In the 1980s the shipbuilding industry
had a priority in industrial policy. The development of the sector was financially supported by
the Japanese government. The traditional close co-operation of the state, shipyards and the
shipping companies in Japan guarantees an institutional framework for the steady development
of the shipbuilding industry. The investment risk was reduced by the government’s guarantee of
supporting the branch in economic crises.55
In South Korea the shipbuilding industry was immensely supported by the government through
the 1980s and the early 1990s. After the successful international establishment of the industry,
government support was reduced and the industrial priority shifted to other branches.
Like the EC, Japan and South Korea support R&D in maritime technology. Both governments
fund a national shipbuilding research institute and grant financing of special projects. Further
public support for the shipbuilding industry is restructuring aid, aid for export credits and
credits for ship owners. 56
3. The Eastern European shipbuilding industry
3.1. Point of departure: the breakdown of socialist, multifunctional shipyards
Under socialism, shipbuilding was first and foremost a military, strategic activity. Civil
shipbuilding was considered secondary. The structure of the shipyards and the modes of
production reflected the principles of socialist production: shipyards were multifunctional units,
in which the production of ships was but one objective; other functions were the provision of
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social services to employees (such as housing, education, culture, access to consumer goods,
etc.) and the maintenance of some political activity and control.
With respect to ship production, a socialist shipyard was characterised by enormous
production depth, i.e. the in-house fabrication of ship outfits and machinery equipment
including winches, steering gear, accommodation, electrical equipment, switchboards, etc..57
Integration was pushed to the limits in the Krasnoje Sormovo shipyard (Nizhny Novgorod),
which had its own steel production and rolling mills.58
Employment in socialist shipyards was very high, when compared on a man/CGT-basis. Direct
employment was 3-4-times higher than in capitalist, Western European, shipyards in the
1980s.59 In East Germany, for example, where the restructuring from socialist to capitalist
shipyards took place extremely quickly, direct employment in the five largest yards was
reduced from 21,000 to about 6,000, with no significant reductions in CGT-output.
Consequently, productivity levels of socialist shipyards were low. Table 7 shows average
estimates for labour productivity in shipbuilding in the early 1990s (Russia and Ukraine are
representative of other post-socialist countries). While the difference between the good world
averages and the good European averages is already striking (almost 1:2), post-socialist
countries lagged far behind at about 0.05-0.075 employee per CGT.
Table 7: Productivity estimates for shipyards (early 1990s)
Country Productivity
(in employee years/CGT)
Russia/Ukraine 0.005-0,075
Good European 0.022-0.028
East Germany (after
restructuring)
0.019-0.024
Good World 0.011-0.017
Sources: AWES, VSM, OECD (1995a)
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In contrast to the deep integration of all productive activities, the socialist shipyard had
practically no proper design or innovation capacity. Design bureaus were independent units,
though they usually belonged to the same Ministry. The design bureaus carried out all stages of
work „from initial design to workshop drawings including material take-off and makers list“.60
The shipyards themselves were reduced to being assemblers. Thus, their capacity for product
differentiation or innovation was very limited.61 The development of own engineering and
design capacity will therefore be a crucial element of the post-socialist restructuring strategy.
With the end of socialism, the socialist industrial structures fell apart, too.62 Monetarisation and
the abandoning of the Party-dominated, non-monetary production lead to the implementation
of new constraints. Just like all socialist productive structures, the multifunctional shipyards,
also, lost their „raison d’être“. Capital constraints and increasing national and international
competition required a radical restructuring of the „industrial ruins of socialism“. Indeed, it
turned out that none of the socialist shipyards in Eastern Europe would be economically viable
as such.
We have called the transformation of socialist industrial combines into capitalist enterprises the
process of „enterprisation“.63 In the following, we shall describe three different patterns of
enterprisation that socialist shipyards have undergone so far: i) the East German enterprisation
through capitalisation; ii) the Polish rapid enterprisation process (which is representative for
other CEE-countries, such as Romania or Croatia); iii) the Russian and Ukrainian hampered
enterprisation with significant state intervention. Our hypothesis is that each of the
restructuring strategies implies different modes of innovation.
3.2. The capitalisation of the East German shipbuilding industry 64
We consider the East German case because of the radical nature of the restructuring process; it
will later serve as a benchmark for evaluating the reform process in other post-socialist
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countries. The restructuring of the East German shipbuilding industry was a radical case of
enterprisation, as the socialist shipyards had become economically unviable the very day of
monetary union with West Germany, i.e. 2. July 1990. The East German case is, off course, a
case of post-socialist restructuring, albeit a very peculiar case. The necessity of radical
restructuring became evident, once the yards were struck by the price shock of July 1990;
deprived of their former clients in the Soviet Union, all seven yards ran substantial losses in
1990 and 1991 (amounting to several hundred million DM).
The only way to maintain some shipbuilding capacity - and thus some employment in the
depressed shore-region of the Baltic Sea (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) - was to inject massive
investments and to create - practically from scratch - new shipyards. This meant that the
Treuhandanstalt (THA), the German Ministry charged with restructuring East German
industry, had to provide massive subsidies to attract external shipyards to take over some of
the remnants of the East German yards, and to invest in new capacity. Under the post
monetary union conditions, enterprisation in East Germany could only work with massive
capital inflows; for this reason, it has been called the process of „capitalisation“.65
Table 8 shows a typical, representative case of capitalising an East German shipyard. The
socialist Mathias Thesen Werft VEB („factory of the people“) employing 6,000 for a capacity
of 135,000 socialist CGT, was closed down. On the same site, a new shipyard is being built,
mainly financed by state subsidies; it will be one of the most modern „compact yards“ in
Europe, featuring an entirely new product range. The new MTW Werft GmbH will employ
about 1,200 people directly; another 900 jobs may be permanently created in 26 new small and
medium enterprises around the site (e.g. in anti-corrosion, construction, concrete, part
assembly; rigging (takelage); mechanical works, craftsmen, etc.). Only the following types of
activities were kept as „core business“ within MTW: shipbuilders, welders, mechanical
engineering; pipe builders; electricians, equipment people.
Table 8: Capitalisation of the socialist Mathias Thesen Werft VEB to the MTW
Schiffswerft GmbH: - A case of creating "new" capacities66
Under Socialism (1989) After Restructuring (1997/98)
Name Mathias Thesen Werft VEB (factory of
the people)
MTW Schiffswerft GmbH
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Owner Schiffbau-Kombinat Rostock,
controlled by the Communist Party and
its "Plan"
Taken over by the BvS (ex-
Treuhandanstalt) and the Land of
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, after the
liquidation of the former owner, the
Bremer Vulkan Group
Berths 2 small open building berths for
shipsizes 87x25 m (5,000 t) and
206x32 m (8,000 t)
New dry dock, 340x67 m; "compact
yard 2000"
Product Range Fishing vessels and refrigerator ships;
multi-purpose transport vessels;
container ships
Very large crude carriers, specialized
container vessels, passenger vessels,
chemical tankers
Maximum
Size Ships
40,000 dead weight tons 300,000 dwt
Markets,
Competition
Bartered with USSR; competition: none Mainly European markets,
competition with West European,
and, increasingly, Polish
shipyards
Employment 6,000 (including social functions) 1,388
Capacity 135,000 CGT "socialist" capacity ca. 100,000 CGT "new" capacity
Treuhand-anstalt
expenditures before
privatization
686.5 mn. DM
THA State aid
(falling under
Art. 92)
997.4 mn. DM
private investment ca. 50 mn. DM
In the other four shipyards, capitalisation proceeded similarly. As a result, five new shipyards
are about to be created in East Germany, with - once finished - a nominal capacity of 327,000
CGT, but capable of producing well beyond 400,000 CGT. When accounting THA-
expenditures and Art. 92-State aid, total expenses amount to 6.3 bn. DM (ca. 3.5 bn. Ecu)!
About 350 mn. DM private investment was attracted, and about 6,000 permanent jobs created
in the shipyards.67 As all five yards were taken over by a West German or Western European
group, they were all rapidly integrated into existing production and sales networks. This
resolved the issue of a particular S&T or innovation policy. Innovation in the capitalised yards
comes from the same sources as innovation in any Western yard. In the East German case, the
only „S&T policy“ was to facilitate the unbundling of the former combines, and the creation of
specialised SMEs.
3.3. Situation in the Eastern European shipbuilding industry 1996/97
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 The restructuring of the shipyards that belonged to Bremer Vulkan (MTW, Volkswerft) was temporarily
halted in 1996, after the liquidation of Bremer Vulkan. However, the Federal and Regional States have made it
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The Shipbuilding Industry38
Before analysing the modes of enterprisation in post-socialist countries, we provide a general
overview of national production figures. As a rule of thumb, with the end of socialism and the
Cold War, the figures of Eastern European ship production dropped in all Eastern European
countries. Some years after this breakdown production usually rises again, and today Poland,
and to some extent Romania and Croatia, are serious competitors on the world ship market;
Russia and Ukraine may become competitors in the near future.68
Eastern European ship production 1988-96
in 1,000 CGT broken down by countries
Production - Ships completed 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
BULGARIA n.a. n.a. n.a. 71 62 71 79 77 86
POLAND 344 238 177 223 306 264 345 474 480
ROMANIA n.a. n.a. n.a. 126 147 72 22 150 149
USSR 56 227 482 365
RUSSIA 22 156 91 82 145
UKRAINE 119 153 210 158 183
YUGOSLAVIA 230 328 293 240
CROATIA 238 104 165 97 257
EASTERN EUROPE 630 793 952 1,025 894 820 912 1,038 1,299
Sources: AWES Annual Reports 1992-1997, EEC Report of the Commission to the Council on the state
 of the shipbuilding industry, COM (95) 38 final, table 5a
Table 9: Eastern European shipbuilding production 1988-96
In 1996 Poland, which is the largest ship producer of the East European countries, held a
market share of 2.9% in terms of world-wide CGT production. It is followed by Croatia,
Ukraine, Romania, Russia and Bulgaria. In the last 3 years, these countries were all able to
keep their market share stable. Together they account for about 7% of the CGT produced
world-wide.
Market shares as a % of world-
wide production 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
BULGARIA 0.51 0.57 0.63 0.54 0.52
CROATIA 1.96 0.84 1.32 0.68 1.55
POLAND 2.53 2.13 2.77 3.31 2.90
ROMANIA 1.21 0.58 0.18 1.05 0.90
RUSSIA 0.18 1.26 0.73 0.57 0.87
UKRAINE 0.98 1.24 1.68 1.10 1.10
EASTERN EUROPE 7.38 6.62 7.31 7.25 7.85
Sources: AWES Annual Reports 1992-1997.
Table 10: Market shares of Eastern European shipbuilding countries 1992-96
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The development of new orders in Eastern Europe shows that the shipbuilding industries are
becoming competitive. The order stock in Eastern Europe grew by about 15% in 1994-95
which was higher than the world average of about 10% (see Appendix A).69
3.3.1. Situation in Poland
In 1990-91 the main market for the Polish shipbuilding industry, the Soviet Union, vanished.
Production dropped by about 1/3 in this period. Today the Polish shipbuilding industry has
finished its reorientation to western markets and has reached almost complete independence
from the Russian market. About 95% of its production is exported, most of the orders coming
from Germany.70 Polish shipyards had 4.5% of the world wide order book stock in 1996 and
they were able to capture 6.5% of new orders in terms of CGT. In the segment for container
ships the Polish shipyards had a market share of 10.5% of the world-wide order stock in March
1997.71 As the division of the orders shows, Poland is highly specialised in MCS ships which
come to 71.61% of all captured orders. In particular, container ships are the speciality of the
Polish shipyards. They alone cover 66.24% of the orders received. The production in the HCS
segments will be in the nexte years insignificant because only 6.21% of Polish order books
contain orders for passenger ships.
Poland
Orderbook in March 
1997 in 1,000 CGT
Share of complete 
orderbook stock in %
Oil 67,813                       5.02
Bulk dry 231,660                     17.16
LCS 299,473                     22.19
Chemical 53,580                       3.97
General Cargo 18,848                       1.40
Container 894,160                     66.24
MCS 966,588                     71.61
Passenger 83,800                       6.21
HCS 83,800                       6.21
Total 1,349,861                  100
Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (1997), own calculations.
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Table 11: Order book stock of Polish shipyards in March 1997 and their division by ship
types.
3.3.2. Situation in Russia
Global developments in Russia are not as rosy as in other East European countries. In 1990,
the Russian government had announced that it would guarantee the existence of 20% of
Russian shipbuilding capacity to secure the required supply of the state. But even for this aim
the required Rouble fund was not made available. In July 1991 the Russian parliament passed
the first version of the Russian Privatisation Law, but so far only 2 of the 16 existing shipyards
have been privatised. The main reason for the slow privatisation is the high percentage of
military production capacities, because they are still seen as being strategically important.72
These obstacles aside, Russia was able to attract 0.87% of world-wide ship production in
terms of CGT in 1996. The order books of Russian shipyards accounted for 1.7% of world-
wide stock in 1996, measured in CGT. But the new orders only accounted for 0.5% of new
orders world-wide, also in terms of CGT.
Russia
Orderbook in March 
1997 in 1,000 CGT
Share of complete 
orderbook stock in %
Oil 50,264                       15.85
Bulk dry 100,800                     31.79
LCS 151,064                     47.64
Chemical 8,662                         2.73
General Cargo 138,115                     43.55
Refrigerated Cargo 18,375                       5.79
Ro-Ro Cargo 7,200                         2.27
MCS 165,152                     52.08
Passenger 900                            0.28
HCS 900                            0.28
Total 317,116                     100
Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (1997), own calculations.
Table 12: Order book stock of Russian shipyards in March 1997 and their division by
ship types.
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The division of the orders attracted shows a strong orientation to the LCS and MCS market
segments. Together these two segments cover 99.72% of the captured orders in March 1997.
Furthermore, the figures show that ship types with low complexity dominate future production
in Russia.
3.3.3. Situation in Ukraine
As in Poland, the Ukrainian shipyards reoriented their economic activities to Western markets.
By far the largest part of production is exported. The largest customer is Greece, followed by
Russia which is still an important customer for Ukraine ships.73
In 1996 Ukraine held a market share of 1.1% of world-wide production in terms of CGT. In
terms of world wide order storage, measured in CGT, it had a share of 1.7% in 1996. In the
same year Ukraine was only able to attract 0.5% of new orders world-wide, measured in
CGT.74
Despite this positive development in production and new orders attracted the main bottleneck
of the Ukrainian shipbuilding industry is the medium and long term financial funding of
production (see below).75
Ukraine
Orderbook in March 
1997 in 1,000 CGT
Share of complete 
orderbook stock in %
Oil 238,919                     53.35
Bulk dry 114,000                     25.46
LCS 352,919                     78.81
General Cargo 14,000                       3.13
Refrigerated Cargo 80,903                       18.07
MCS 94,903                       21.19
HCS -                             0.00
Total 447,822                     100
Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (1997), own calculations.
Table 13: Order book stock of Ukrainian shipyards in March 1997 and their division by
ship types.
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The order stock of Ukrainian shipyards shows they were mainly active in the LCS market
segment, which covers 78.81% of captured orders in Ukraine. In the HCS segment they were
not able to attract a single order.
3.3.4. Conclusions
As the production and captured orders show, Poland is the most successful shipbuilding nation
in Eastern Europe. With its rapid reorientation to western markets, Poland was able to reach
competitiveness in some segments of the shipbuilding market. In 1996 it was able to attract
10% of world-wide orders in the container ship segment.
Russia and Ukraine have similar developments in terms of production and attraction of orders.
With world market shares of 0.87% and 1.1%, in terms of CGT, of world production, they are
of lesser importance in the shipbuilding market.
The production of the three countries shows further different structures. Whereas the Polish
shipyards are mainly active in the MCS market segment, Ukraine’s shipbuilding industry is
mainly active in the LCS segment. Russia’s shipbuilding industry focuses mainly on LCS and
MCS, where both segments have a similar importance. Similar for all Eastern European
countries is the insignificant attraction or even the absence, as in the case of Ukraine, of orders
for HCS.
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Figure 6: Division of the order stock of Poland, Russia and Ukraine in March 1997
3.4. Enterprisation, restructuring and public policies in Eastern Europe
In Eastern Europe, one can distinguish two fundamentally different paths of restructuring:
Poland represents for relatively quick enterprisation, while Russia and Ukraine represent
hampered and largely unachieved enterprisation. In this section, we sketch out the major trends
in these countries.
3.4.1. Enterprisation of the Polish shipyards
The Polish shipbuilding industry is a good example of a promising turnaround that took place
after enterprisation of the yards. In 1989, the three main shipyards (Szczecin, Gdynia, Gdansk)
still produced mainly for Polish and Soviet Union clients.76 Product specialisation was low, but
so, too, were the maximum sizes of the ships (30,000 dwt maximum, at Szczecin). Exports to
non-socialist countries already existed, but their absolute volume was limited (around 20%).
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 We are concentrating on those three large shipyards that will be internationally relevant. Among the four
other yards that we do not deal with, two are currently attempting conversion to civilian shipbuilding (Stoczina
Polnocna S.A. in Gdansk and Stocznia Marynarki Wojennej in Gdynia), one was already enterprized by family
businesses 8Stocznia Wisla) and one was closed down (Stocznia Ustka). Their radius of activity is only local.
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Just as in other socialist countries, the degree of integration was high, including some
(underdeveloped) design capacities.
Monetarisation in 1990 forced all three shipyards to adopt market- and capital-oriented
restructuring strategies. Common elements of the process of enterprisation were the following:
- product specialisation; once all-rounder, the Polish yards sought to become competitive in
the low-end segments, mainly container ships, general cargo vessels, and tankers. Sixty percent
of Polish production is in this segment, where Polish yards have obtained a world market share
of 11%; in the segment of 900-1,750 TEU container ships, Polish yards are even said to hold
35% of the world market!;77
- outsourcing could not proceed as quickly as in the East German case, but the Polish yards
started to emulate the Western strategy of concentrating on core business. For example,
Szczecin increased the external value added to 16% (1995) and rising, the other two increased
to 10%.78 The unbundled enterprises became independent economic entities, though generally
they remained the sphere of a larger „holding“ company for some time;79
- labour shedding was not as radical as in East Germany, but remained significant nonetheless.
In the 1980s, employment in shipbuilding was about 40,000; in 1996, direct employment fell to
about 22,000 in 1997 (of which: Szczecin: 6,000; Gdynia: 6,000; Gdansk: 7,000), to which a
few thousands have to be added in subcontractors;
- computerisation and process automation was an integral part of the adaptation process.
Computer hardware and software was purchased to enhance design and optimise production,
but also for Management Information Systems (MIS);
- solving the issue of debts and credits outstanding was the major non-technical obstacle to
obtaining liquidity for new investment. While the Polish government officially claimed not to
support its shipbuilding industry, it did subsidise their development - indirectly - through the
generous take-over of debts (that amounted to several tens of mn. USD).80
Though all three shipyards have embarked upon the enterprisation train, results are mixed.
Only Szczecin has clearly established itself as a specialised, profitable shipyard and is
increasingly competitive. The future of Gdynia depends on its capacity to attract investment, be
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it domestic (Szczecin is said to be interested) or foreign (e.g. the Norwegian Kvaerner group).
As regards the most traditional Gdansk yard, it may surge like a phoenix from the ashes after
its liquidation in 1997, depending upon the new owner’s strategy.
The largest problem of the Polish yards is not the technical competitiveness but the high level
of debts. The reasons for these debts are found in socialist times where contracts were signed
for much too low prices and have to be carried out today with heavy losses. On the other hand
large debts were accounted to the shipyards from the socialist governments which also have to
be paid off today. So in some cases the government takes over the debts of the shipyards to
secure their existence. Other support for the shipyards was not granted in the period 1990-95
by the Polish government.81 In September 1994 the government decided to grant guarantees
for credit extended by a bank to the Gdansk Shipyard for the first time.82 In October 1995 the
government further decided to grant financial support for US $ 600 million for increasing the
competitiveness of their shipyards. This is granted in the form of allowances and credit
guarantees.83 It remains to be seen whether the Polish government adopts the same (bad)
habits as shipbuilding nations around the world.
In any event, in 1997, the Polish shipbuilding industry seems to have overcome the worst traps
of post-socialist restructuring, and embarked upon an ambitious catching-up process. Order
books are increasing, and so is the ranking of Poland in international competition, in particular
in Europe. Polish yards serve mainly German, French, and British clients (Germany alone buys
about 40% of Polish ships, with Szczecin selling almost 2/3 to Germany).
3.4.2. Case study: enterprisation and new network at the Szczecin shipyard, 1990-97
The enterprisation of the Szczecin shipyard is the best example of how rapid enterprisation and
the reorientation of production can lead to international competitiveness in post-socialist
shipbuilding. On the verge of bankruptcy in 1991, Szczecin shipyard has emerged as the most
competitive Eastern European yard, and is becoming an international benchmark in container
shipbuilding.
After monetarisation in 1990, all Polish yards had to reorganise both production and the
portfolios of ships. In socialist times, the Szczecin yard was the most backward of the three
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large Polish yards, and could only produce medium-size ships. It was largely oriented towards
Eastern European clients, most of whom cancelled their orders after 1990 or did not pay for
finished ships. Hence, in late 1991, bankruptcy was considered as the only solution. Only the
fact that it was still state-owned and was the major employer in the region guaranteed its
survival.
The turnaround came with specialisation on a small segment of low value-added ships (mainly
container vessels), the development of new, Western clients, and increased outsourcing and co-
operation with multiple suppliers. The key operation may have been acquiring an extremely
long series of contracts for the B-183 container vessel (1,000 TEU), for which the first order
was received in 1989. Since 1991, no less than 30 (!) vessels of this type were built, enabling
the shipyard to organise efficient production structures, cut new building times, and reduce
costs.84 Following up on this success story, Szczecin has become a major international player
in container shipbuilding.
As concerns the organisational structure, outsourcing and the development of new supplier
relations meant that Szczecin specialised in shipbuilding and abandoned some of its former
activities (e.g. software production, which is now imported). Investments were made in
automation, capacity increase (the new Odra-Nowa Slipway permits the construction of ships
with a hull width of 40 m, including modern Panamax bulkers up to 50,000 dwt and container
vessels up to 2,500 TEU), and increasing technical and production capabilities.
Figure 7 shows the emerging network of the Szczecin-shipyard, both with regard to suppliers
and clients. We estimate that most of the sources of innovation are external (though the precise
links to the many Polish research institutions have yet to be clarified). Upstream, Szczecin was
able to support the modernisation of the motor supplier HCP and the conversion of the
FAMAK Machines and Appliances Factory (Kluczbork), a former mining supplier.
Interestingly, the Polish yard employs 200 Russian welders, who demand low wages at equal
quality. Downstream, Szczecin’s integration with the Polish shipping company PZM shipping
can only marginally offset its dependence upon Western European clients; two thirds of the
final demand is accounted for German shipping companies. On the horizontal axis,
participation in its equity (30%) of two large banks (Polski Bank Rozwoji and Bank
Handlowy) and the purchase of an insurance company have strengthened Szczecin’s financial
capabilities.
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The international production and sales network
of the Szczecin shipyard (1997)
Szczecin
Warsaw
Czestochowa
USA
- computers
- software
- final demand (2/3)
- radar system
- heavy cranes - steel
- 200 welders
- electronics
- motor
steel
imports
Cegielski Marine Engines Co.
- basic research
- Bank Handlowy
- debt relief, subsidies?
Germany /
Western Europe
Denmark
- co-operation
   with B/M
Famak Kluczbork
Mining Co.
- PZM shipping
- basic research
- shipyard
Kalinin-
grad
Figure 7: The international production and sales network of the Szczecin shipyard
Today, having succeeded but not having consolidated its enterprisation process, Szczecin has
two basic options: either to proceed along the path of product specialisation and concentrate
on shipbuilding, or to diversify into an industrial group in which shipbuilding plays only a
minor part. Given the success story of the last five years in shipbuilding, the former strategy
seems to be a more realistic choice. In that case, outsourcing would have to be continued,
specialisation pushed further, and the current situation as a strong niche-player be maintained.
However, it seems that the Szczecin yard - and along with it the Polish government that is still
stuck with some ownership - prefers the creation of an industrial shipbuilding group. In that
latter case, the group would also have to take care of suppliers (e.g. HCP engines) and,
eventually, even the Gdynia yard.85 In that case, though, the Szczecin yard and the Polish
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government would forego a unique opportunity: to prove to the rest of the world that
shipbuilding can be a profitable activity that does not have to be permanently subsidised.
3.4.3. Enterprisation and state industrial policy in Russia and Ukraine
In Russia and Ukraine, the enterprisation of the shipyards has started, but the process is quite
different from the Polish and other CEE-countries’ cases:
- enterprisation is slower;
- in Russia, there is only one geographical area that concentrates over 75% of the country’s
shipbuilding activities (Leningrad oblast), which has led to a very peculiar post-socialist
„cluster“;
- the state continues to pursue an active, vertically-oriented industrial policy, in particular
Ukraine, trying to preserve the unpreservable socialist industrial structures.
Given these particularities, it comes as no surprise that the restructuring process of the Russian
and Ukrainian shipyards is much less advanced and more open than in Poland, Romania, or
Croatia.
As concerns the organisation of production, the structure of Russian and Ukrainian shipyards
has not changed fundamentally.86 The production depth remains high; shipyards assure
outfitting, and machinery fabrication as well as hull fabrication and assembly. Pre-fabrication of
system elements is inflexible. As it is still carried out within the yard, few incentives exist for
productivity increases or diversification. Design capacities are still largely outside the yards,
and the interconnection between design and production is insufficient. The level of
informatisation is low, in particular as regards CAD, work preparation, and production control.
However, the obstacles to restructuring are not mainly technical, but commercial and
organisational. On the commercial side, shipyards have not been able to specialise their offers,
and largely depend on foreign trade organisations, such as „Sudoexport“ and „Sudoimport“
(though some concentration on bulk carriers and crude oil tankers exists). Production is
constrained, not so much by lacking orders, but by lacking liquidity to purchase material and
machinery. As only 50% of the value of a ship is usually paid in advance, yards have to find
liquidity for the remaining 50%. Given the quasi-absence of commercial or bank credits, this is
not an easy task. Another basic obstacle to deep restructuring is the absence of applicable
                                               
86
 Cf. OECD (1995a), upon which this section is partly based.
by J. Bitzer and C. von Hirschhausen 49
legislation on critical issues of enterprisation: examples are the issue of inter-enterprise arrears,
treatment of old debts, and the partitioning of local infrastructure (e.g. water, electricity, heat).
In contrast to Poland and other CEE-countries, the Russian and Ukrainian governments have
taken an active role in the restructuring of industry at large, and in shipbuilding in particular.
Instead of pursuing a horizontal industrial policy that could facilitate enterprisation locally,
both governments developed substantive support programs for the shipbuilding industry:
Russia
In Russia, conversion programs were developed under the auspices of the „Russian Federation
Committee of Defense Industries“. The so-called „conversion“ can go both ways: medium-
sized shipyards should convert their military production to civil products; larger Russian yards
also have to convert to naval shipbuilding (which was formerly concentrated in the Ukrainian
Socialist Republic, e.g. cruisers and destroyers, aircraft carriers). Another element is the „state
fleet modernisation programme“, that is supposed to support the modernisation of the Russian
merchant marine fleet, and even to extend it. For the conversion of military capacities in non-
military capacities the government grants financial support, which is controlled by the "Russian
Federation Committee of Defence Industries". Financial support is granted for product
development, adaptation of production facilities and for bridging labour costs during necessary
peak times.87
The renewal and extension programme influences the shipbuilding industry only indirectly. In
this programme, the government grants a budget of US$ 9 billion until the year 2000 for
building 3,000 seagoing and river vessels, of which a substantial part of them are built abroad.
Nevertheless the Russian shipbuilding industry will benefit from this programme if it carried
out. Today, however, it is already obvious, that the programme will not be achieved because
neither the necessary Rouble funds, nor the foreign currency are available for the domestic
shipyards and building abroad, respectively.
Ukraine
Compared to Russia the economic situation in Ukraine is worse. The extreme shortage of
financial resources prevents any governmental support for the state owned shipyards.
Therefore, all efforts are oriented to promoting the export of ships. In Ukraine, similar
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programs were defined for conversion and development („National Program for the
Development of the Shipbuilding Industry“ under preparation). The state Prominvestbank will
be obliged to issue credits to certain shipyards. Import tariffs should be reduced for „strategic“
parts purchased abroad.88 It is highly questionable whether this „planned“ restructuring process
has a chance of success.89
As regards privatisation, neither country has achieved substantial progress: in Russia, the
attempts to privatise the shipyards were carried out very slowly. So in 1995, only two of the
16 Russian shipyards were privatised. The high percentage of military production capacities is
one of the main hampering factors for privatisation because such shipyards are still regarded as
strategically important. Foreign investors are hard to attract because the basic conditions are
still unfavourable for foreign direct investments in the shipbuilding industry. So it has so far not
been possible to buy the ground over which the yards extend.90
In Ukraine, the government had announced a privatisation programme, like Russia, but they
disassociated all shipyards together from this programme. The result is that all 32 (15 new
construction and repair shipyards, 9 river yards and 8 yards for fishery vessels) Ukrainian
shipyards are still state owned.91 This situation also prevents the attraction of foreign direct
investment in the Ukrainian shipyards.
In contrast to Poland, the enterprisation of shipyards in Russia and Ukraine is foremost a
regional problem. This is particularly the case for the Leningrad-Oblast, where 16 shipyards,
several design bureaux, and a host of suppliers are concentrated (see figure 8).
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Figure 8: Shipbuilding cluster in Leningrad-Oblast
It seems that the privatised ALMAZ-shipyard is becoming the centre of a regional shipbuilding
cluster. Whether this will lead to real capitalist economic activity or some form of post-socialist
Financial-Industrial Group is still open.
Within this opaque enterprisation process in shipbuilding , there is hardly any rationale for an
S&T policy. Innovations are mainly a result of co-operation with foreign enterprises, be they
system suppliers or clients. Design capacities and informatisation have to be increased in the
yards, but this is possible without substantial state support. Finally, increasing the absorptive
capacity of the yards is mainly a question of pushing enterprisation forward, and unbundling
suppliers, thus making them more flexible and capable of diversifying their production
spectrum.
3.5. A taxonomy of East-West co-operation in shipbuilding
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The breakdown of the CAEM and the restructuring of post-socialist yards (including China)
have given a major impetus to international co-operation in shipbuilding. Co-operation
between „developing“ and „developed“ shipyards is rising; motivation is bi-directional:
developing shipyards need the technology transfer, design and access to markets that
developed shipyards can offer. In the other direction, developed shipyards are looking for
opportunities to outsource parts of production, or even the bulk of the production process.
The proximity between Eastern and Western European shipyards, the relatively high level of
capabilities in Eastern European yards, and the EU-CEE wage differential imply that East-
West co-operation is bound to increase.
The term „co-operation“ means regular business contacts between two or more shipyards
(horizontal), or between suppliers, shipyards, and customers (vertical), that are to some extent
institutionalised. It is evident that suppliers and yards in East and West are always in some
state of co-competition (see above). In the following, we propose a classification of co-
operation:92
1. regular supply of components means regular or exclusive agreements with suppliers
and/or shipyards of another country. In general, the „components“ should be of a certain value
or technological content, such as entire hull sections, outfitting, electronics, or motors;
2. sub-contracting and licensed production become more intense once the technological
level of the developing shipyards is rising. Examples are labour-intensive steel work, diesel
engine production, but also shared production of entire ships;
3. technological co-operation and training can be done by exchange of personnel and/or
codified knowledge, such as blueprints of design or software. One common strategy of
„catching-up“ for developing shipyards is to participate in the production of a prototype ship in
a developed shipyard, and to „copy“ the design and production process with its own means
thereafter. Developed yards have an interest in this „second-best“ co-operation, as competition
between them for markets and sub-contractors in developing countries is fierce;
4. Capital participation and joint ventures are the most explicit forms of co-operation,
with one partner taking direct influence on the other. Joint-ventures are by far the most
                                               
92
 The typology of co-operation and the concrete cases in this section are taken from OECD (1996).
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developed type of co-operation, as transaction costs are lower than for capital participation.
This is particularly the case in countries where the legal framework is unstable or non-existent.
The following list shows how fast East-West co-operation has developed in the 1990s: almost
non-existent in socialist times, Eastern European shipyards today account for 40% of all
registered co-operation of OECD-shipyards; when considering only the European OECD-
yards, this ratio is as high as 63%.
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Table 14: Emerging patterns of co-operation between OECD and Eastern European shipyards
"Western" shipyard "Eastern" shipyard type of cooperation remarks
1. supply of 
components
2. sub-contracting/ 
licensed production
3. technological co-
operation
4. capital particip./joint-
ventures
Astilleros de Huelva (Spain) Baltija Shipyard, Klaipeda (Lithuania) x sub-contracting of outfitting works
Kvaerner Group (Norway) Severnaya Shipyard (Russia) x licensing production
Fosen Mek. Verkst. A/S (Norway) Galatz (Romania) x x
Damen B.V., Gorinchem (Netherlands) Sev-Mash Predpriyatiye, Severodvinsk (Russia) x hull production in sev-Mash
Estaleiros Navals (Vianayard (Portugal) Yards in Russia and Ukraine x x subcontracting of hulls, licensing production
HDW, Kiel (Germany) shipyard in Poland x x supplier of components
Lloyd Werft, BHV (Germany) Pregol-yard, Kaliningrad (Russia) x x shiprepair
Mützelfeldtwerft, CUX (Germany) Romanian shipyard x x subcontracting of hulls
FATA, Torino (Italy) Kershon Shipyard (Ukraine) x build fast ferries (?)
Mariotti (Italy) Okean Shipyard (Ukraine) x x hull-production in Okean
Fassmer&Co, Mothen (Germany) Yantar Shipyard, Kaliningrad (Russia) x aluminium construction
several smaller yards Poland x
several smalller yards Romania x
British marine equipment suppliers, 
London (Great Britain)
Ukainian shipyards x technology transfer, equipment
Vulkan, Bremer (Germany) Severnaya, St. Petersburg (Russia) x x small vessels
Kvaerner Group (Norway) Sever Shipyard, Archangel (Russia) x x conversion to civilian production
Daewoo (Korea) Romanian shipyard; Mangalia (Romania) x x know-how training
Arminus Werke (Germany) Withe Sea&Onega Shipping Co., St. Petersburg 
(Russia)
x "Onega Arminus Shipbuilders"
Arminus, Stinnes  (Germany) North Western Shipping Cor., St. Petersburg 
(Russia)
x "New Newskij Shipyard"
Cassens yard  (Germany) Volgo-Don Shipping Co., Rostov/Don (Russia) x "Don Cassens shipbuilders"
Elbewerft Boizenburg  (Germany) Zelenodolsk, Tatarstan (Russia) x joint construction/operation
H. Peters, Wewelsfleth (Germany) Slip Shipyard, Rybinks (Russia) x design by Peters, built in Rybinks
Mittelst. Serienschiffbauges. (MSG) 
(Germany)
shipyard ventures (Russia) x outsourcing
Kvaerner Group (Norway) Vyborg Shipyard, St. Petersburg (Russia) x direct investment
Odense Staalskibsvaerft (Denmark) Loksa shipyard, Tallinn (Estonia) x purchased for hatchcover production
Mc Dermott (U.S.) MacAmur (Russia) x
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4. Conclusions
As the paper has shown, shipbuilding is a complex and logistically intensive production process. In
the Western world, the largest part of a ship is nowadays developed and produced outside of the
shipyard. The supplier network therefore plays a crucial role in the development and the production
of a ship. The suppliers are highly specialised and therefore able to develop and produce even the
essential parts of the ship, like the engine, the navigation system, the electronics, the computer
equipment etc. without the participation of the shipyard. With the emergence of "compact yards", the
shipyard is reduced to an "assembly line". The Eastern European yards will have to take this
development into account.
There is no such think as a single “world market“. Instead, the merchant shipbuilding markets can be
divided into the segments for low complex ships, medium complex ships and high complex ships.
Production requirements, competition axes and market participants differ between these segments.
Any competition analysis has to be adopted to this segmentation.
With the collapse of socialism, the socialist mode of ship production collapsed, and the Eastern
European countries lost their traditional clients, i.e. mainly the Soviet Union. They had to reorient
their activities to world market conditions and compete with Western capitalist shipyards. Therefore
the restructuring from highly integrated shipyards towards non-integrated production structures with
an efficient supplier network is the basic condition for a successful restructuring. This non-integrated
production structures further enables the Eastern European shipyards to compensate their
disadvantages in high tech equipment through the purchase of required parts from western
producers. The use of modern maritime technology is a prior condition to participate in the
competition on world markets.
Innovation in the Eastern European shipbuilding industry comes from internal (e.g. design bureaux,
R&D departments, etc.) as well as from external (e.g. suppliers, research institutes, etc.) sources.
Through their suppliers the Eastern European shipyards use the domestic and foreign S&T systems.
In particular, foreign suppliers and with it their S&T system are used by the Eastern European
shipyards to access to modern maritime technologies. The result is that the shipbuilding industry in
Eastern Europe is not longer solely dependent on national S&T systems.
While shipbuilding is a subsidised activity in all producing countries around the world, it is not
certain that Eastern European countries should emulate this tendency. Dept relief and restructuring
aid may be justified, whereas production aid seems to be a bad choice. National S&T-policies have
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to be reviewed critically, using a demand-oriented perspective, and targeting the most critical
obstacles to restructuring and enterprization. While in Poland the restructuring of the industry is
rather advanced, in Russia and Ukraine, an acceleration of the enterprization process is needed if
shipbuilding is to have a future.
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Appendix A
New orders and orderbook by country 1992-1996 in 1,000 CGT
Countries 1993 1994 1995 1996
New orders Oderbook* New orders Oderbook* New orders Oderbook* New orders Oderbook*
BELGIUM 17 134 54 118 3 96 1 28
DENMARK 390 698 382 596 109 299 269 651
FINLAND 515 791 277 961 178 855 384 881
FRANCE 227 569 240 678 66 513 111 448
GERMANY 1.029 1.600 1.034 1.591 1.714 2.290 799 1.952
GREECE 7 44 0 104 1 13 0 1
IRELAND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ITALY 511 1.039 345 1.029 1.081 1.860 662 1.843
NETHERLANDS 305 386 343 442 460 600 542 811
NORWAY 252 371 263 411 235 360 293 389
PORTUGAL 6 46 44 76 64 112 98 156
SPAIN 360 476 404 668 378 735 345 668
SWEDEN 1 0 0 0 12 25 99 99
UNITED KINGDOM 66 321 39 212 107 192 86 182
TOTAL WESTERN EUROPE 3.686 6.475 3.425 6.886 4.408 7.950 3.690 8.108
BULGARIA 42 142 64 149 134 199 40 148
CROATIA 153 511 270 466 58 430 321 505
POLAND 191 1.014 678 999 1.085 1.685 491 1.455
ROMANIA 150 861 140 944 203 972 104 761
RUSSIA 358 779 170 887 81 770 101 550
UKRAINE 291 426 397 702 191 737 90 554
EASTERN EUROPE 1.185 3.733 1.719 4.147 1.752 4.793 1.147 3.973
OTHERS 57 318 154 413 196 493 245 571
EUROPE 4.928 10.526 5.298 11.446 6.356 13.236 5.082 12.652
CHINA 437 1.257 547 1.262 837 1.446 1.226 1.924
JAPAN 4.681 6.256 6.688 8.000 5.898 8.173 6.294 8.480
KOREA 3.673 4.793 3.088 5.867 4.114 6.845 3.744 6.872
Subtotal ASIA 8.791 12.306 10.323 15.129 10.849 16.464 11.264 17.276
REST OF WORLD 807 1.960 1.132 2.384 1.227 2.361 1.159 2.295
TOTAL WORLD 14.526 24.792 16.753 28.959 18.432 32.061 17.505 32.222
*At 31.12. of the named year.
Source: AWES, (several issues).
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Appendix B
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLETIONS BY REGION AND TYPE OF SHIP 1991 TO 1996 
Absolute figures in 1,000 CGT  market shares in  %
Year AWES** Japan South Korea Others Total*
CGT % CGT % CGT % CGT % CGT %
Dry Cargo 1991 1,186 34.3 1,082 31.3 462 13.4 726 21.0 3,456 30.0
Ships 1992 1,249 33.1 1,243 32.9 484 12.8 799 21.2 3,775 31.2
incl. 1993 984 29.2 1,257 37.3 324 9.6 805 23.9 3,369 27.2
Boxships 1994 1,339 32.0 1,494 35.7 605 14.5 747 17.8 4,185 33.1
1995 1,292 29.0 1,697 38.1 835 18.8 625 14.0 4,449 31.1
1996 1,838 34.9 1,342 25.5 1,401 26.6 682 13.0 5,264 31.8
Bulk 1991 176 9.7 936 51.5 436 24.0 268 14.8 1,816 15.8
Carriers 1992 170 10.6 491 30.6 603 37.6 339 21.1 1,603 13.2
incl. 1993 84 42.0 823 41.0 597 29.8 502 25.0 2,006 16.2
Combined 1994 132 4.1 2,002 61.7 587 18.1 523 16.1 3,244 25.7
Carriers 1995 305 7.2 2,435 57.3 941 22.1 573 13.5 4,253 29.7
1996 221 4.8 2,656 57.2 988 21.3 776 16.7 4,641 28.0
Oil 1991 93 5.7 753 46.4 539 33.2 239 14.7 1,624 14.1
Tankers 1992 263 10.2 1,327 51.3 688 26.6 310 12.0 2,588 21.4
1993 429 17.3 1,270 51.1 512 20.6 274 11.0 2,486 20.1
1994 193 12.7 639 42.2 423 27.9 259 17.1 1,514 12.0
1995 269 17.0 551 34.9 694 43.9 67 42.0 1,581 11.0
1996 153 10.1 614 40.5 705 46.5 44 2.9 1,515 9.1
Gas/Chem. 1991 418 18.2 1,213 52.9 251 11.0 409 17.9 2,291 19.9
and 1992 516 24.0 1,031 48.0 210 9.8 389 18.1 2,146 17.7
Product 1993 352 15.1 1,249 53.8 384 16.6 338 14.5 2,322 18.8
Tankers 1994 310 15.2 782 38.4 479 23.5 465 22.8 2,036 16.1
1995 422 20.5 770 37.5 392 19.1 471 22.9 2,054 14.3
1996 572 20.4 1,107 39.4 426 15.2 702 25.0 2,807 17.0
Fishing 1991 264 36.0 164 22.3 34 4.6 272 37.1 734 6.4
Vessels 1992 324 57.9 64 11.4 8 1.4 164 29.3 560 4.6
1993 128 21.3 52 8.6 15 2.5 404 67.5 598 4.8
1994 213 53.3 58 14.5 1 0.3 129 32.3 400 3.2
1995 110 42.0 51 19.5 4 1.5 97 37.0 262 1.8
1996 167 54.0 29 9.3 2 0.5 112 36.2 309 1.9
Others 1991 1,021 63.7 270 16.8 7 0.4 306 19.1 1,604 13.9
1992 877 60.7 223 15.4 2 0.1 343 23.7 1,445 11.9
1993 1,033 64.6 204 12.8 3 2.0 358 22.4 1,599 12.9
1994 714 56.8 203 16.2 9 0.7 330 26.3 1,256 9.9
1995 1,308 75.8 140 8.1 22 1.2 255 14.8 1,725 12.0
1996 1,354 67.2 243 12.1 27 1.3 390 19.4 2,014 12.2
Total 1991 3,158 27.4 4,417 38.3 1,729 15.0 2,222 19.3 11,526 100.0
1992 3,396 28.0 4,379 36.1 1,995 16.5 2,346 19.4 12,118 100.0
1993 3,010 24.3 4,854 392.0 1,835 14.8 2,681 21.7 12,380 100.0
1994 2,902 23.0 5,177 41.0 2,104 16.7 2,453 19.4 12,636 100.0
1995 3,705 25.9 5,644 39.4 2,887 202.0 2,089 14.6 14,325 100.0
1996 4,304 26.0 5,991 36.2 3,549 21.5 2,706 16.3 16,550 100.0
*Diferences are due to roundings
**Since 1995 including Poland
Source: AWES, (several issues).
